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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
Regulation of the Labor Relations of 
Multinational Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis 
and a Proposal for NLRA Reform 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid expansion of the multinational enterprise (MNE) to a position of 
dominance in world trade is probably the major development in the post-
World War II international economy. The MNE is one of the most controver-
sial economic and political entities of the modern world. Its effect on trade and 
investment patterns is hotly debated in horne and host countries alike. 
While the political and economic consequences of the tremendous growth of 
multinationals have been discussed widely, their impact on the work forces of 
the affected countries has received much less critical analysis. Specifically, the 
effects that MNEs have on jobs, income, unionism and other labor related 
issues only now are being subjected to intensive study. 1 
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine some of the legal problems 
created by MNEs with regard to labor relations. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on national efforts designed to regulate the labor relations activities of 
multinationals and a proposal for reform of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) will be advanced. Initially this study will discuss the nature of union-
management dynamics in the transnational setting. After briefly viewing the 
1. See generally C. F. BERGSTEN, T. HORST & T. H. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS 
AND AMERICAN INTERESTS 99-120 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS]; 
Kujawa, U. S. Labor, Multinational Enterprise and the National Interest: A Proposal]or Labor Law Reform, 
10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 941 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kujawa]; 1 U.S. DEPT OF COM-
MERCE, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: STUDIES ON U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1972); 
U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE AND 
ITs INT'L TRADE SUBCOMM., IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAl. FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR (Comm. Print 1973). Several of the books which 
have dealt with the subject are the products of symposia. BAR(;AINING WITHOUT BORDERS: THE 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND INTERNATIONAl. LABOR RELATIONS (R. j. Flanagan & A. 
R. Weber eds. 1974); AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION (D. Kujawa 
ed. 1973); TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL REI.ATIONS (H. Gunter ed. 1972). 
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options available to labor to combat the inherent inequality of bargaining 
power between national unions and large MNEs, it will examine national ef-
forts in the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden which attempt to 
remedy or ameliorate this inequality. This will be followed by a discussion of 
multilateral and international efforts undertaken by the European Com-
munities, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
the United Nations. Finally, this Comment will examine the American legal 
framework oflabor relations between unions and MNEs. It will conclude with 
proposed amendments to the National Labor Relations Act which would 
remedy the presently existing power imbalance. 
The author contends that reforms of the NLRA which countervail the 
bargaining advantage MNEs have over national unions are necessary, partly 
to introduce a new concept and partly to overcome judicial and administrative 
interpretations of the Act. Three changes are needed: 1) an amendment to § 
8( d) to make employee representation in management a mandatory subject of 
bargaining; 2) an extension of the subject matter jurisdiction of the Act to its 
full reach under the Commerce Clause through an amendment to § 2(6); and 
3) removal of the present protection MNEs enjoy from the secondary boycott 
prohibitions of the Act by amending § 8(b)(4)(B). 
II. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED: INEQUALITY OF POWER BETWEEN 
MNEs AND NATIONAL LABOR UNIONS 
A. Dynamics of Labor-Management Relations in the Transnational Setting 
If there existed no great disequilibrium between the economic weaponry 
available to MNEs and that at the disposal of labor, then no serious labor rela-
tions problems would exist. A balance of power promotes concessions by both 
sides; the forces of collective bargaining would prevent the disproportionate 
gain of one necessarily to the disadvantage of the other. The MNEs are in a 
much stronger position by virtue of their size, resources and, most especially, 
their multinational character. As a result, national unions feel that they are on 
the defensive and seek assistance from government to aid them in their strug-
gles against the multinationals. 
This inequality of bargaining power arises chiefly from the nature of the 
multinational enterprise. The MNE is a coherent organization with a narrow 
and specific range of economic motivations; it is a formidably swift and effec-
tive machine. 2 As a result of its size and the fact that it operates within several 
national jurisdictions, the MNE is able to minimize or avoid some of the con-
trols and checks and balances that have evolved within the national 
2. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge]or Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
739, 756 (1969-1970) [hereinafter cited as VagtsJ; see generally R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT 
BAY: THE MULTINATIONALSPREADOFU.S. ENTERPRISES (1971). In comparing MNEs to nation-
states, Professor Vagts made the following observations: 
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frameworks of the various countries in which it operates. 3 MNEs can max-
imize their advantages among different national jurisdictions regarding such 
vitally important factors as fiscal and labor market conditions. By intra-
corporate accounting devices such as transfer pricing, the MNE can deter-
mine where to show profits thereby avoiding tax liability. + All these manipula-
tions may adversely affect the national union member. 
The ability of multinational firms to deal from a position of strength with 
labor unions arises more directly out of their size and scope. MNEs are able to 
break strikes by shifting production among their various subsidiaries in dif-
ferent countries in a way that minimizes disruptions in the overall production 
system and maintains service to the market affected by the industrial dispute. 5 
A firm could also "run away" from or permanently reduce operations in areas 
(1) the MNE has a structure and orientation which allow it to develop a strategy that is 
more nearly global in viewpoint than that of any previous business entity - that is, one 
which pays less heed to national frontiers in pursuit of its objectives; (2) the MNE's 
emphasis on technology makes it both a formidable competitor or antagonist and a 
highly desirable guest; and (3) the MNE is a large scale enterprise with many readily 
available resources and frequently a commanding market position. 
Vagts, supra, at 756-57. The same factors which give MNEs an advantage over nations give them 
the same advantages over national unions. 
3. Cox, Labor and the Multi1llJtionals, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 344, 353 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Cox); see AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 100-01. 
4. Cox, supra note 3, at 353; Comment, National Labor Unions v. Muitinati01llJ1 Companies: The 
Dilemma of Unequal Bargaining Power, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 124, 125 (1972) [hereinafter 
cited as NLU v. MNC); Rose, The Rewarding Strategies of Multi1llJti01llJlism, FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 
1968, at 100, 101. See I.R.C. § 462 for the U.S. legislative response to the problem of taxation in 
the face of transfer pricing within MNEs. 
5. Blake, Trade Unions and the Challenge of the Multi1llJtionai Corporation, 403 ANNALS 34, 36-37 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Blake); see Cox, supra note 3, at 353. But see Shearer, Fact and Fiction 
Concerning Muitinati01llJ1 Labor Relations, 10 V AND. J. TRANSNA T'L L. 51, 55-56 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Shearer), who argues that the transfer of operations overseas to combat strikes is illusory 
because of the high costs involved in such transfers; and who contends that the use of imports to 
maintain domestic sales in the face of a strike, while a real potential threat, is a politically unac-
ceptable weapon because it would lead to adverse reactions both by other unions and by 
lawmakers which could lead to changes in trade legislation to prevent such strike-breaking tech-
niques. Accord Kujawa, supra note 1, at 949; Gould, Muitinati01llJ1 Corporations and Muitinati01llJ1 
Unions: Myths, Reality and Law, 10 INT'L LAW. 655, 659-61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gould); 
Int'l Labour Office, Industrial Relations in a Muitinati01llJ1 Framework, 107 INT'L LAB. REV. 496 
(1973). 
It is not so important, however, whether MNEs frequently engage in these activities or not; the 
feasibility of their use combined with a belief by union leaders that they do occur leads to the 
same result: an inequality of bargaining power. See Address by George Ball, Columbia Law 
School (Feb. 26, 1976), reprinted in Conference on the Regulation of Transnat'l Corps., The 
Friedman Series in Int'l Law, Columbia Law School 44, 49 (1976) (limited circulation in Har-
vard Law School Int'l Legal Studies Library). Based on an exhaustive analysis of the relevant 
data, a Brookings Institution study concludes that: 
Though it is doubtful that multinational enterprises export significant numbers of 
jobs from the United States or adversely affect labor's share of American income 
distribution, some jobs are exported ... and the position oflabor in collective bargain-
ing is weakened by the multinationalization of business. In addition, labor's belief, 
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of high costs or adverse labor conditions through changes in its patterns of in-
vestment, production and organization. 6 
As long as different countries maintain sharply different policies and as long 
as labor conditions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the MNEs un-
doubtedly will continue their attempts to take advantage of the climate most 
favorable to them. The sophisticated and centralized information and 
decision-making systems available to and utilized by the MNEs allow these 
firms to actively and aggressively exploit their advantages over both national 
governments and national unions so as to force the latter into a defensive 
posture. 7 
The principal weaknesses of unions in confronting the MNEs are readily 
apparent and easily catalogued. Labor is generally well-organized and well-
paid in the industrialized home countries of MNEs, whereas it is docile and 
cheap in developing host countries. 8 This may be a major incentive for MNE 
location in a particular host country. 9 The lack of union power there makes it 
difficult or impossible to initiate coordinated labor policies in both countries. 
Further, differences in labor ideologies and politics, especially noticeable be-
tween unions in the U.S. and Europe, make concerted action difficult.lO 
whether well-founded or not, that jobs are exported has led it to search for effective 
means to countervail the perceived power of multinational enterprises. 
AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 110; accord Kujawa, supra note 1, at 946. For an 
enlightening discussion of the views of the AFL-CIO, see the entire issue of VIEWPOINT, Fourth 
Quarter 1975 (see especially Talce the Money and Run, id., at 2, 6-8). 
6. NLU v. MNC, supra note 4, at 125. For example, Chrysler Corporation considered dispos-
ing of its United Kingdom subsidiary, Chrysler U.K. Ltd., in late 1975 partly because of labor 
problems. Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1975, at 4, col. 2. Later that same year, the large British 
automaker, British Leyland, announced plans to liquidate its Italian subsidiary, Leyland In-
nocenti, because of labor problems. !d., Nov. 28, 1975, at 4, col. 5. A recent example of 
"runaway" operations are those engaged in by American automakers and electronics companies 
in Mexico. These firms ship parts from American manufacturing plants just across the border to 
Juarez where they are assembled as finished products by low-paid Mexican workers. The prod-
ucts are then shipped back to the U.S. Crucial to the success of these manipulations are the im-
port duties charged by both nations. Because the MNEs are providing much needed employ-
ment, the Mexican Government exempts the imported parts from duties; and the U.S. taxes only 
the value added upon reshipment to America. It is thus cheaper to pay the low Mexican wages 
and the import duties on the products assembled in Mexico than it is to pay U.S. workers to do 
the assembly. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 1; see Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1979, at 32, 
col. 3. 
7. Cox, supra note 3, at 353-54; see note 5 supra. 
8. Cox, supra note 3, at 354. This is especially true in labor intensive industries, such as textile 
manufacturing, light fabricating and assembly business. Hildebrand, Multinational Corporations: 
Their General Significance and Their Relation to Home Employment, in THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 17, 21 (Michigan Business Papers No. 61, W. Sichel ed. 1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Hildebrand). 
9. Cox, supra note 3, at 354; see Blake, International Labor and the Regulation of Multinational Cor-
porations: Proposals and Prospects, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 179, 188 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Blake, 
International Labor). 
10. Cox, supra note 3, at 354. Also, the varying objectives oflabor in developed and develop-
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Finally, a labor organization is inherently different from an MNE; it is not as 
amenable to centralized control and decision-making because conflicting in-
terest groups within the union must be dealt with and satisfied. Without the 
swiftness of action and centralization of authority of the MNE, the union can-
not act quickly and effectively to counter hostile actions by the firms. 
In short, the evidence supports the conclusion that bargaining power has 
shifted decisively in favor of the MNEs.11 Unions have responded with 
counter-strategies to remedy this imbalance. 
B. Union Strategies Designed to Combat the Power oj MNEs 
Unions have searched for effective means to countervail the power of MNEs 
to remedy the perceived and actual export of jobs and weakened position of 
labor in collective bargaining. Union efforts have followed two broad 
strategies: 1) the reduction of the mobility of the multinationals; and 2) the in-
crease of the ability of labor to counter that mobility. Tactically, labor can 
pursue these strategies either internationally or nationally, the former by coor-
dinating their activities with foreign labor groups, the latter by enlisting 
governmental support for their objectives. 12 
1. Multinational Unions and Transnational Bargaining 
Labor's transnational efforts to overcome its weaknesses VIs-a-vis the 
MNEs have included support for union organization abroad, political 
pressure on recalcitrant foreign governments and efforts to develop a common 
ideological framework to promote cooperation between labor organizations in 
different countries. 13 Future industrial relations are envisioned here as 
gradually developing to the point where multinational unions are able to deal 
with global corporations from a position of relative strength and parity. Since 
space limitations preclude an in-depth discussion of the relative merits and 
ing countries may be large deterrents. According to B. C. Roberts and Jonathan May, "conflicts 
of interest between unions in home and host countries of multinational enterprises . . . at bottom 
are probably the main obstacle to effective international union collaboration." Roberts & May, 
The Response of Multinational Enterprises to International Trade Union Pressures, 12 BRIT. J. INDUS. 
REL. 403, 416 (1974). 
11. Kujawa, supra note 1, at 953. 
12. AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1 at 110; Cox, supra note 3, at 353-59. 
13. Cox, supra note 3, at 353-54. Transnational bargaining, its attendant strategies and legal 
ramifications are outside the scope of this Comment. For a discussion thereof see Kujawa, supra 
note 1, at 956-62; Murphy, Multinational Corporations and Free Coordinated Bargaining: An Alternative 
to Protectionism?, 28 LAB. L.J. 619 (1977); Shearer, supra note 5; Note, Multinational Collective 
Bargaining - Myth or Reality?, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 101 (1976); Leonard, Coordinated Bargain-
ing with Multinational Firms hy American Lahor Unions, 25 LAB. L.J. 746 (1974); Seham, Transnational 
Lahor Relations: The First Steps Are Being Taken, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'LBus. 337 (1974); Blake, supra 
note 5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1979, § A, at 7, col. 4; id., Nov. 20,1978, § A, at 10, col. 
3; if. Goldberg, Coordinated Bargaining Tactics of Unions, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 897 (1969). 
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strategies involved in transnational bargaining, the foregoing is mentioned 
merely to indicate one possible labor strategy in dealing with MNEs. Suffice it 
to say that, among major American labor organizations, only the U.A.W. 
actively supports this strategy. 14 
2. Increased Home and Host Country Control Over MNEs 
Juxtaposed to the transnational efforts of unions to meet the transnational 
challenge of the corporations is a strategy that calls for increased political 
pressure by unions in home and host countries. The aim here is to enact local 
controls that eliminate the advantages enjoyed by MNEs because of their 
multinational character. 15 Although confined within the borders of a single 
State, national unions would not be disadvantaged in their dealings with 
MNEs if national governments enacted and enforced laws to prevent abuse of 
the unequal bargaining situation. 16 These efforts to employ local law in at-
tempting to control the labor relations activities of the multinational firms 
have been undertaken in various jurisdictions. They are advocated by most 
labor organizations, including the AFL-CIOY 
III. ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL EFFORTS 
AT COUNTERVAILING THE POWER OF MNEs 
A. National Efforts 
1. The Federal Republic of Germany 
In Western Europe, labor participation on corporate boards has been ad-
vanced as an effective means of responding to the challenges posed by existing 
labor-management relations. Prominent among the proposed reforms is the 
system of employee codetermination (Mitbestimmung), established in West Ger-
many just after World War II, which provides for the election of employee 
directors to a specified number of seats on corporate boards. Although not 
directed specifically at MNEs, codetermination has large implications for 
multinationals doing business in Germany. 
The underpinnings of employee participation in Germany have their 
origins in the early 1900s.18 Although provisions appear in statutes as early as 
14. Cox, supra note 3, at 354-55. For a discussion of various European, Asian and some 
American efforts in this regard, see AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 113-18. 
15. Cox, supra note 3, at 355. 
16. NLU v. MNC, supra note 4, at 126; AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS. supra note 1, at 119; see § 
III.A irifra. 
17. Cox, supra note 3, at 355; see § V.A infra. 
18. For a discussion of the history of codetermination in Germany, see Vorbrugg, Labor Par-
ticipation in German Companies and Its European Context, 11 INrI. LAW. 249 (1977); Gruson & 
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1919,19 codetermination in modern West Germany did not become firmly en-
trenched until 1951. The Codetermination Act of 1951 (Montanmitbestim-
mungsgesetz)20 provides for equal employee-shareholder representation on the 
supervisory boards21 of corporations in the coal and steel industries; it was 
later extended to include coal and steel holding companies. 22 A less radical 
form of codetermination for all stock corporations outside coal and steel was 
inaugurated a year later. The 1952 Works Constitution Law (Betriebsver-
Jassungsgesetz)23 allocated one-third of the seats on the supervisory boards of 
these corporations to employee representatives. 24 
Responding to increased union pressure over the next twenty years to end 
the disparity between the coal and steel companies and the rest of West Ger-
man corporations, a new, more extensive code termination law was passed in 
1976. 25 This legislation ostensibly extends fifty-fifty representation to most 
types of West German indu~try;26 however, due to various provisions27 the 
shareholders have majority control. Even though the workers have not 
achieved true parity representation, unions have gained the power to gen-
uinely influence the direction of German industry. 28 
Meilicke, The New Co-Determination Law in Germany, 32 Bus. LAW. 571 (1977); Note, Employee 
Codl:termination: Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 
HARV.J. LEGIS. 947, 949-52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Employee Codetermination]; Meissel 
& Fogel, Co-Determination in Germany: Labor's Participation in Management, 9 INT'L LAW. 182 (1975). 
19. Law of March 23, 1919, S 2, [1919] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 1343 (Ger.); Law of April 
24, 1919, art. 1(1), [1919] RGBI 1413 (Ger.); Law of Feb. 4, 1920, [1920] RGBI I 147 (Ger.); 
Law of Feb. 15, 1922, H 3, 4, [1922] RGBI 1209 (Ger.). 
20. Law of May 21,1951, [1951] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] 1347 (W. Ger.). 
21. German corporations are governed by a two-tier system of directors. The supervisory 
board (AuJsichtsrat) decides basic issues of corporate policy and oversees corporate operations. A 
management board (Vorstrand), appointed by the supervisory board, is in charge of the day-to-
day operation of the corporation. Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 18, at 952 n.l0. Ger-
man codetermination involves the placing of employee representatives on the supervisory board. 
22. Law of Aug. 7, 1956, [1956] BGBI 1707 (W. Ger.). 
23. Law of Oct. 11, 1952, SS 76-77, [1952] BGBI 1681 (W. Ger.). The codetermination pro-
visions exempt family-run businesses employing less than 500 persons. /d. H 76(6),77(1). 
24. [d. S 76(1). 
25. Law of May 4, 1976, [1976] BGBI I 1153 (W. Ger.) [hereinafter cited as New Law]. For 
an English translation of the law see P. PELTZER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETzlCO-DETERMINATION 
LAW (1976). For an in-depth discussion of the provisions and effects of the New Law, see the 
authorities cited in note 18 supra; Fabricus, The New German Codetermination Law, 1977 J. Bus. L. 
101; Rittner, A New ConstitutionJor German Big Business: The Co-Determination Act 1976, 1 HASTINGS 
INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 113 (1977). 
26. New Law, supra note 25, S 1. 
27. E.g., the chairman of the board, who has two votes in order to break a tie, New Law, supra 
note 25, S 29(2), is elected by a two-thirds majority when no candidate succeeds after two ballots. 
/d. S 27(2). The shareholders thus have a deJacto right to elect the chairman. 
28. E.g., labor has a powerful voice in the selection of management board members because 
appointments thereto must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the supervisory board; in the 
event no such vote is achieved a mediation board composed of equal numbers of labor and 
shareholder representatives nominate candidates who are then elected by a simple majority. New 
Law, supra note 25, § 31. . 
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The implications of this new law for MNEs is clear. Through labor 
representation on the supervisory boards of multinationals in Germany, 
employees have acquired access to important information about corporate 
operations and have achieved a measure of control over corporate policy at the 
highest levels. 29 Thus a union in West Germany can successfully countervail 
the power of the multinational through the exercise of the power codetermina-
tion has given them. The German arm of the multinational is no longer a 
pawn subject to the absolute commands of the central MNE decision-makers. 
Despite the fact that at least one respected international law scholar considers 
the new law to be a violation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation between the U.S. and West Germany30 as it applies to subsidiaries 
of American MNEs,31 it appears that codetermination is well established in 
West Germany32 and that it has emerged as an effective method of local con-
trol over the operations of MNEs within a single country. 
2. Sweden 
Sweden is one home country which has made a major effort to check the ac-
tivities of its locally based multinationals in host countries through national 
legislation. It has enacted two laws dealing directly with MNEs. Swedish 
legislation authorizing government insurance for foreign direct investment in 
developing countries requires that the insured firm meet specific national 
29. See A. STURMTHAL, COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS 65-69 (1972). 
30. Oct. 29, 1954, Federal Republic of Germany - United States, arts. V(l), (3)-(5), VII(l), 
(4), [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593. 
31. Professor Wengler in Parity Codetermination in West German Companies and International Law, 9 
VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1,39(1976), comments: 
1. The right of American shareholders in companies of the Federal Republic to de-
mand that members of the supervisory board continue to be elected under the regula-
tions hitherto in force is a property right protected against encroachment by the 
German-American Commercial Treaty of 1954, especially in light of its. most-favored-
nation clause and in light of other treaties for the protection of investments which the 
Federal Republic has concluded with third countries. 
2. The introduction of parity codetermination would be an encroachment on the rights 
of American shareholders in violation of the Treaty. 
32. There had been some doubt as to the constitutionality of the New Law. Business op-
ponents charged that the parity requirement violated Articles 14 and 9(3) of the German Con-
stitution. GRUNDGESETZ arts. 14,9(3) (W. Ger.). Article 14 is similar to the Fifth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution because it proscribes government interference in property rights without 
justification in the public interest. Article 9(3) guarantees persons the right to organize for 
economic benefit. But doubt as to the validity of the law was ended recently by a decision of the 
West German Supreme Court. In the Judgment of Mar. 1, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. 
Ger., N. Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1979, § D, at 11, col. 4, the court unanimously ruled that the New 
Law is consistent with both the Grundgesetz and basic statutes governing companies, 
shareholders and coalitions of employers. James Furlong, commenting on this decision in The 
Wall Street Journal, considers it to be a favorable holding which "is likely to have profound 
domestic consequences and produce a substantial ripple effect abroad." Furlong, Manager'sJour-
nal: Workers in the Board Room, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1979, at 18, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as 
Furlong]. 
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standards in such matters as collective bargaining rights, compensation for 
wage losses during illnesses, injuries and layoffs, pensions and several other 
health and welfare matters. 33 This law is designed to help workers in host 
countries, rather than those in Sweden, on matters of interest common to 
both. The effectiveness of the legislation is questionable, however, since no 
Swedish firm has ever used the insurance; they ignore the insurance program 
rather than meet its conditions. 34 
The ability of Swedish labor to deal directly with multinationals has been in-
creased by another law. In 1974, amendments to legislation on capital move-
ments were passed to require Central Bank approval of all capital outflows for 
foreign direct investment by Swedish-based firms.35 All corporate applications 
for such permission must be accompanied by statements on the proposed in-
vestment from both blue-collar and white-collar unions. 36 The remedial effect 
of this law also is unknown at present. As of February 1979, no applications 
have been denied and it is too early to determine how much Swedish labor will 
gain from this opportunity Y 
Sweden also has adopted a system of employee codetermination similar to 
that of Germany. A provisional statute which took effect in 1973 provided for 
the direct election of two employee representatives and two alternates to the 
board38 of any company with a work force of 100 or more. 39 After the expira-
33. Law of July 17, 1968, [1968] Sverges Forfattmingssamling [SFS] 447 (Swed.) (Social 
Conditions Attached to the Swedish Investment Guarantee Scheme), translated in part in Blake, In-
ternational Labor, supra note 9, at 192-95; AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS. supra note 1, at 112. Such 
legislation is very similar to that in the United States which created the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC). 22 U.S.C. H 2191-2200a (1976). The purpose of OPIC is "[t]o 
mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic 
and social development of less developed friendly countries and areas, thereby complementing 
the development assistance objectives of the United States .... " 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1976), as 
arrumded by Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-268, § 2, 92 Stat. 213. 
34. AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 112; Letter from Professor Gunnar 
Hedlund, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute of International Business, to author (Feb. 
23,1979) [hereinafter cited as Letter from Professor Hedlund] (copy available in the Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review offices). 
35. Law of June 18, 1974, [1974] SFS 458 (Swed.) (amending Law of June 22,1939, (1939] 
SFS 350 (Swed.), and Law of June 5, 1959, (1959] SFS 264 (Swed.» [hereinafter cited as 1974 
Law]. See The Economist, April 13, 1974, at 10, col. 1. 
36. 1974 Law, supra note 35. 
37. The 1974 Law requires the foreign exchange board of the Swedish Central Bank (Sveriges 
Riksbank) to assess the consequences for employment and industrial structure in Sweden of 
transfers of capital. The board, on which union representatives sit, has been liberal so far; but 
union representatives are said to have veto power in practice, if not formally. Letter from Pro-
fessor Hedlund, supra note 34, at 2, see also AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 113. 
38. Swedish corporations have a unitary board of directors system, ordinarily employing three 
executive and three non-executive members, excluding worker representatives. Note, Employee 
Codetermination, supra note 18, at 977 n.94. 
39. Law of Dec. 28, 1972, [1972] SFS 829 (Swed.). For a full explanation and critique of the 
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tion of this experimental law, a permanent statute was passed in 1976 which 
expanded the same representation requirements to all companies with twenty-
five or more employees. 40 The role of the employee-director is made explicit in 
this law, whereas in the German legislation the role is less clearly delineated. 
An employee-director acts in the same capacity as other board members, ex-
cept that he may not be a part of discussions or decisions concerning labor 
negotiations, collective bargaining agreement terminations, strikes and other 
conflict of interest situationsY Thus, while allowing an effective representa-
tion of the employee viewpoint, the legislation avoids awkward and dangerous 
conflict of interest actions by labor directors. 
Further legislation was enacted to expand the scope of codetermination even 
moreY This law broadly provides that individual companies and their unions 
must collectively negotiate rules with respect to all policies which may have an 
impact upon working conditions. 43 As a result, Swedish-based employers are 
required to negotiate with unions before they can order production changes, 
invest in new facilities, acquire other companies, or adopt any other measures 
which could affect plant employment. H 
The implications of the new laws for Swedish multinationals and foreign 
MNEs doing business in Sweden are great. While not focused directly at 
MNEs, these worker participation statutes may prove to be as, if not more, ef-
fective weapons in the hands of labor than the foreign direct investment laws 
designed specifically to countervail the power of the MNEs. As is true with the 
German system, because decision-making is no longer exclusively in the 
hands of corporate shareholder management and because employees now have 
access to important information about corporate operations, the power im-
balance caused by the multinational scope of MNE operations has been nearly 
equalized. 
law, see Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 18, at 976-79; L. FORSEBACK. INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT IN SWEDEN 55 (1976); Gorton, Employee Participation in Swedish 
Company Law, 1.975 J. Bus. L. 163; Garde, Co-Determination in Sweden: Functions for Boards with 
Employee Representatives, 8 INT"L LAW. 344 (1974). 
40. Law of June 3, 1976, [1976J SFS 351 (Swed.). The alternate employee directors are 
entitled to attend and speak at all meetings, but cannot vote when the employee directors are in 
attendance. Id. § 15. The presence of these alternates tends to reduce the isolation of labor 
representatives, particularly on larger boards. At least one employee director has the right to at-
tend any executive committee meetings. Id. § 16. This prevents circumvention of the codeter-
mination law through the establishment of subcommittees composed solely of shareholder direc-
tors to carryon the business of the board. 
41. !d. §§8, 17. 
42. Law of June 10,1976, [1976J SFS 580 (Swed.); see Wall 5t. J., June 4,1976, at 6, col. 3. 
43. Law of June 10, 1976, § 32, [1976J Sf'S 580 (Swed.). 
44. See Wall St. J., June 4, 1976, at 6, col. 3; Worker Participation Becomes Law, BUSINESS WEEK, 
June 21,1976, at 42. 
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B. Multinational and International Efforts 
Primary responsibility for regulation of labor relations must rest with in-
dividual States because industrial relations is an area of vital local concern. It 
is true, however, that many measures designed to control the activities of 
MNEs in the employment field will be ineffective or frustrated unless they are 
accompanied by action at the multinational or international level which pro-
motes cooperation and harmonization. To this end the European Com-
munities (EC),45 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD)46 and the United Nations have developed programs and pro-
posals. 
1. European Communities 
The EC in recent years has drafted two proposals to harmonize Community 
law to ensure worker participation in management. One goal, as in Sweden 
and Germany, is to place reins on corporate activity which is adverse to 
Ulllons. 
In an attempt to standardize corporate structure throughout the Commu-
nity, the Executive Commission of the EC has drafted a proposed directive 
(Fifth Draft Directive) under which all member States would adopt the Ger-
man two-tier board system for corporations with 500 or more employees. 47 
Employee representation on supervisory boards is assured and two methods 
are provided to achieve this representation. Under the first, a minimum of 
one-third of the members of the supervisory board would be appointed by the 
workers or their representatives. 48 Under the second, the workers would have 
an input into the selection of each supervisory board member. 49 
Another major proposal is the creation of Community-wide corporations. 50 
Enfranchised to operate under a single legal framework throughout the EC, 
45. The European Community was established by the Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, [1958] 
295 U.N.T.S. 2. 
46. The OECD was established by the Convention on the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Dec. 4,1960, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891. 
47. Comm'n of the European Communities, Proposed Fifth Draft Directive Concerning the 
Structure ofSocietes Anonymes and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, art. 2, 15 O. J. 
EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 49 (1972), [1979]1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), 1401 [hereinafter cited 
as Fifth Draft Directive]. 
48. Id., art. 4(2), [1979]1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) , 1401B; see Malawer, Labor Law in the 
Common Market - Worker Participation and Other Recent Developments, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 65 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Malawer]. 
49. Fifth Draft Directive, supra note 47, art. 4(3), [1979]1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), 1401B; 
see Malawer, supra note 48, at 66. 
50. Comm'n of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute 
for European Companies, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Supp. 4175 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Statute]; see Malawer, supra note 48, at 57-58. 
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these "Societe Europeennes" or S.E.s would be required to adopt a two-tiered 
management hierarchy. 51 The supervisory board would be divided into thirds, 
including an equal number of representatives of shareholders, employees and 
independent "general interests." 52 
If adopted both these proposals would go a long way towards controlling the 
activities of MNEs throughout the EC. The first would simply extend the 
German-Swedish system of codetermination to each individual State in the 
Community. Such a harmonization oflaws is favorable because codetermina-
tion appears to be an effective method oflocal control over MNEs. The second 
plan is more ambitious as it is intended to allow unions to operate transna-
tionally on a par with business enterprises which do so. Although the basic 
premise of codetermination is the same, the Statute for European Companies 
would foster a few big unions to countervail the power of the few big MNEs, 
whereas the Fifth Draft Directive would strengthen the present multitude of 
national unions to regulate the activities of the local subsidiaries of the MNEs. 
Either method appears to offer an effective means of control over the labor 
relations-related activities of MNEs. 
2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
While the EC was developing plans for codetermination in Community cor-
porations, the OECD adopted guidelines of conduct for multinationals 
operating within member countries. 53 These guidelines are merely recommen-
dations jointly addressed by OECD members to MNEs operating in their ter-
ritories; they are voluntary and not legally enforceable, 54 except to the extent 
individual States treat them as such with implementing legislation. 
Regarding the equalization of union-management power, the guidelines ad-
vocate disclosure of relevant information by MNEs55 as well as consultation 
between the MNEs, unions and government over management decisions 
which would adversely affect employment. 56 In addition MNEs are prohibited 
51. Statute, supra note 50, art. 73; see Malawer, supra note 48, at 67. 
52. Statute, supra note 50, art. 74a(1), as amended by Comm'n of the European Communities, 
Information Memo No. P-24, The European Company Statute Amendments, [1973-1975 
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) , 9745; see Malawer, supra note 48, at 69. 
53. OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, OECD Doc. 
21(76)04/1, Annex, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 11-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Guidelines]. 
54. /d. at 12, , 6. But it is argued that the guidelines impose defacto obligations on MNEs. The 
reasons advanced for this conclusion are: 1) a desire on the part of MNEs to cultivate good public 
and governmental relations; and 2) since the guidelines are proclaimed to embody standards of 
good conduct universally recognized among Western industrial countries, they may be indicative 
of the future trend of international law. Plaine, The DEeD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises, 
11 INT'L LAW. 339, 343-46 (1977). 
55. Guidelines, supra note 53, at 16, " 2(b), 3. 
56. /d. at 17, , 6. 
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from threatening to transfer production in order to gain conceSSIOns from 
labor during negotiations or organizing drives. 57 
The major drawback of these proposals is their nonbinding status. Without 
a legally enforceable obligation, there is little to entice MNEs to comply, 
especially where their own self-interests are at variance to the guidelines. The 
specific provisions regarding disclosure and consultation may prove to be ade-
quate counterbalances to the transnational power of MNEs if they were man-
datory; but to request the multinationals to comply voluntarily when to do so 
would infringe on corporate policy and adversely affect profits is too much to 
expect. These weaknesses would be mitigated if individual governments 
adopted the proposals as law or regulation. Therefore the member countries of 
the OECD should agree jointly to enact the guidelines into law, and give them 
the comprehensive mandatory character necessary for their successful im-
plementation. 
3. United Nations 
Recognizing that the absence of an international forum makes it difficult to 
achieve agreement on international regulation of MNEs,58 a Group of Emi-
nent Persons (Group)59 submitted a report on multinational corporations to 
the Secretary-General of the U. N. which recommended that both a commis-
sion on multinational corporations and a center on information and research 
be established under the U.N. Economic and Social Counci1. 60 The purposes 
of these bodies are to investigate and study the operations and impacts of 
multinationals and recommend programs designed to deal with the problems 
discovered. 
In the field of employment and labor, the Group felt that consideration 
should be given to ways of concerting national action at the international level 
in order to render it more effective. Specifically, it was recommended that the 
proposed commission on MNEs "study the various forms and procedures that 
could be ~volved to ensure the protection of workers and their unions in the 
decision-making process of multinational corporations at the local and inter-
national level. ' '61 This proposal is the same in spirit as European codetermina-
57. [d. at 17, , 8. See Int'I Labour Org., Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy' 52 (Nov. 16, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ILO 
Declaration), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 422, 429 (1978), which also advocates that 
MNEs not threaten to transfer production to influence collective bargaining negotiations. 
58. Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on 
Development and on International Relations 51, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Report). 
59. The Group of Eminent Persons was established as a result of a recommendation from the 
U.N. Economic and Social Council (E.S.C.) to the Secretary General. E.S.C. Res. 1721,53 
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No.1), U.N. Doc. E/5209 (1972). 
60. Report, supra note 58, at 52. 
61. !d. at 77. 
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tion, but lacks the mandatory participation of labor in company management. 
The Group also suggested that home and host countries permit free entry to 
unionists from other countries, thereby facilitating international coordination 
of labor comparable to that of the MNE. 62 This tactic is advocated by the pro-
ponents of transnational unionism as well. 63 
A further recommendation of the Group is similar to one of the OECD 
guidelines, i. e., to enact international standards of disclosure, accounting and 
reporting to allow for the dissemination of data which are of special relevance 
in collective bargaining. 64 Such standards would tend to equalize the bargain-
ing positions of labor and management because unions would be much more 
knowledgeable about the worldwide operations and fiscal health of the MNEs 
than they are at present. The final recommendation was designed to en-
courage coordinated activity by national unions against MNEs. It calls for 
national governments to adopt liberal policies regarding the use of sympathy 
strikes or other peaceful forms of concerted action by labor.65 This recommen-
dation is identical to efforts made within the U.S. to legitimize presently 
unlawful labor weapons against MNEs.66 
The commission and the center proposed by the Group of Eminent Persons 
were established by resolution of the U.N. Economic and Social Council.67 As 
a heterogeneous international body, any recommendations the Commission 
on Transnational Corporations makes would be less likely to achieve full ac-
ceptance than would those of a homogeneous body, such as the EC or OECD. 
But one advantage it has over a regional group is the benefit of the informa-
tion and research conducted by the Centre on Transnational Corporations on 
a permanent and on-going basis. 68 
Among its various responsibilities, the Commission has assigned priority to 
the drafting of a code of conduct for MNEs.69 A code is considered essential 
62. /d. 
63. See authorities cited at note 13 supra. 
64. Report, supra note 58, at 79. See ILO Declaration, supra note 57, at , 54, for a similar pro-
posal. 
65. Report, supra note 58, at 78. 
66. See § IV.C infra. 
67. The Commission was established on December 5, 1974, E.S.C. Res. 1913, 57 U.N. 
ESCOR, Supp. (No. lA), U.N. Doc. E/5570/Add. 1 (1975); and the Centre on Transnational 
Corporations was established on August 2,1974. E.S.C. Res. 1908,57 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 
(No.1), 6, U.N. Doc. E/5570 (1974). For an excellent and in-depth discussion of the work of the 
Commission, see Rubin, Harmonization of Rules: A Perspective on the U.N. Commission on Transna-
tional Corporations, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 875 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rubin]. 
68. E.S.C. Res. 1913, supra note 67, at' 4. 
69. E.S.C., Comm'n on Transnat'l Corporations, Report on the Fourth Session, 63 U.N. 
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 12) " 13, 68, U.N. Doc. E/1978/52, E/C. 10/43 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as Fourth Session Report]; E.S.C., Comm'n on Transnt'l Corporations, Report on the Second 
Session, 61 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No.5), Annex IV, "2,42, U.N. Doc. E/5782, EtC. 10/16 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as CTC Report]. 
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for the regulation of MNEs. 70 There is a basic split in the Commission as to 
whether or not the code should be mandatory or voluntary.71 
As of this writing, the Commission has not formulated a code nor has it 
made any recommendations concerning regulation of the labor relations of 
MNEs.72 It appears, however, that the labor aspects of any emergent code 
likely would be an amalgamation of strategies and tactics presently exigent in 
Europe and North America and those advanced by representatives of the 
Third World. Without such a combination of methods and philosophies pros-
pects for the attainment of rules acceptable to all are dim.73 
Given the tremendous differences between nations regarding the proper in-
ternational mechanism for control of MNEs, the drafting and passage of a 
comprehensive code is many years in the future. Although it is possible that a 
partial code, regulating only labor relations, might be implemented sooner, 
control of the labor relations activities of multinationals will be left up to in-
dividual States for the foreseeable future. Since the United States is home to 
the greatest number and most influential of MNEs, 74 its laws are crucial to any 
regulatory scheme. 
IV. THE ApPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES 
The existing legal framework of modern labor-management relations in the 
United States was borne in an era of relative national economic independence. 
As a result the original National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),75 the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA),76 and the subsequent amendments and 
additions thereto,77 have limited the scope oflegal regulation to the boundaries 
of the nation. 78 Legislative, administrative and judicial policymakers have fail-
ed to recognize the present transnational scope of labor relations issues and 
thus have neither adapted preexisting standards nor enacted new rules to cor-
respond to changed circumstances. 
To successfully implement reforms of the legal framework oflabor relations 
in the U.S., it is necessary to determine initially the status of the multinational 
employer within that system. The extraterritorial reach of U.S. labor laws is 
70. Rubin. supra note 67, at 886. 
71. The Report of the Group of Eminent Persons recommended that the code it envisioned be 
non-compulsory, Report, supra note 58, at 55, but the Commission is divided on whether to ac-
cept this recommendation. CTC Report, supra note 69, at " 43-44. 
72. See, e.g., Fourth Session Report, supra note 69, at" 12-15; E.S.C. Comm'n on Transnat'l 
Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination, U.N. 
Doc. E/C. 10/38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Re-Examination]. 
73. See Rubin, supra note 67, at 889. 
74. See Re-Examination, supra note 72, at 211, table III-8. 
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-59 (1976). 
76. 29 US.C. §§ 141-97 (1976). 
77. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 541 (1959); Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). 
78. See § lV. B infra. 
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relevant in this context as is the legality of certain economic weapons available 
to unions in their struggles against the MNEs. 
A. Status of MNEs as Employers: Singular or Plural Entities? 
The MNE can choose among a variety of legal forms to establish its 
presence in more than one country. Those that are most suitable to the par-
ticular business activities engaged in will be chosen. 79 But, mere juridical ex-
istence often does not reflect accurately the true dispersal of management and 
control functions within the enterprise. The parent corporation has the option 
of retaining centralized decision-making authority or engaging in arms length 
transactions, depending upon various legal implications. 80 Consequently, it 
may be necessary to pierce the corporate veil in order to deal with the actual as 
opposed to legal status of the parent and its subsidiaries. 
Many factors are relevant to such an analysis, some of which are: 1) degree 
of ownership of the subsidiary; 2) existence of common officers or directors; 3) 
the degree of intermingling or separation of accounts, tax returns, etc.; 4) 
undercapitalization of the subsidiary; 5) representations by either parent or 
subsidiary which tend to obscure the legal separation of the entities; 6) degree 
of supervision of the day-to-day operation of the subsidiary; and 7) ultimate 
responsibility for operation of the subsidiary. No single factor is decisive; they 
are often combined to support the decision. 81 
The position of the U. S. Government regarding uni~ary corporate existence 
on an international level is as follows: 
When a subsidiary acts on behalf of a foreign parent, and there is 
such an identity of interest between the two or such control by one 
over the other that the one is in reality the alter ego of the other, or 
its mere agent, instrumentality, or adjunct, then the parent comes 
within the U.S. jurisdiction. 82 
For purposes of coverage of the U.S. labor laws, whether a given MNE is con-
sidered a single employer entity, or two or more separate employers, depends 
79. For an excellent summary of the various forms and stages of MNE existence, see Griffin, 
The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in the European Economic Communi!}> 
and the United States, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 375, 378-83 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Griffin). 
80. For example, antitrust and tax problems may dictate tight or loose control respectively. See 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Willis & Pitofsky, An-
titrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y. U. L. REV. 20 (1968), for a discussion of 
antitrust considerations, and I.R.C. S 482; Kragen, Avoidance of International Double TtlXfJtion Aris-
ing From Section 482 Reallocations, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1493 (1972), for an example and discussion of 
a statutory attempt to prevent tax evasion by MNEs. 
81. Griffin, supra note 79, at 389; W. L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
109-49 (1969); Krendl & Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEN. L. J. 1 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Krendl & Krendl); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1102 (1971). 
82. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Memorandum Transmitted to the Embassy of Japan, Washington, 
D.C., with Note Guly 3, 1958), reprinted in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 6, 
at 118-19 (1968). 
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almost entirely upon the question of common labor relations control. 83 Such a 
determination is crucial to labor organizations in their dealings with MNEs. If 
an enterprise is recognized as one employer with a multinational existence, 
then potentially powerful union weapons against all corporate subsidiaries, 
such as strikes, picketing and boycotts, will be permitted as lawful primary ac-
tivity. But if the MNE is deemed a separate employer in each of its locations, 
then these same actions will be secondary and prohibited by U.S. lawY 
Therefore, the definition of "employer" under our labor laws and its applica-
tion to MNEs has far-reaching effects on unions' abilities to use traditional 
economic weaponry to combat transnational capital. 
Under section 2(2) of the NLRA, "[t]he term 'employer' includes any per-
son acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly .... ";85 and 
under section 2(1) thereof "[t]he term 'person' includes one or more in-
dividuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal 
representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. "86 The com-
bination of these definitions leads to a rather amorphous and circuitous con-
ception of an employer when viewed against modern corporate organization. 
Obviously, administrative and judicial interpretations of these sections are 
needed to give effect to congressional intent. 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is the ad-
ministrative body which implements the major U.S. labor relations lawsY 
The Board has held, with court approval, that separate corporate subsidiaries 
are separate persons or employers "if neither the subsidiaries nor the parent 
exercises actual or active, as opposed to merely potential control over the day-
to-day operations or labor relations of the other.' '88 Thus, what is needed to 
establish that the enterprise as a whole is an employer is both common owner-
ship and common control. 89 
This "single enterprise doctrine" devised by the NLRB is ill-suited to the 
83. Gould, supra note 5, at 661. 
84. See S IV. C infra. 
85. NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). 
86. Id. § 2(1), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976). 
87. See id. § 3-6,29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56 (1976). 
88. Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69, 185 N .L.R.B. 303, 304 (1970), eni'd per curiam, 
443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972); accord AFTRA Washington-
Baltimore Local, AFL-CIO, 185 N.L.R.B. 593 (1970), tni'd. 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
89. General Teamster, Warehouse and Dairy Employees, Local No. 126, 175 N.L.R.B. 630 
(1969), tni'd, 435 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1970); Miami Newspaper Pressman's Local No. 46, 138 
N.L.R.B. 1346 (1962), tni'd, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Drivers, Chauffers and Helpers 
Local 639, 158 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1966). This test has been applied to situations of substantial joint 
ownership as well as circumstances of corporate subsidiaries. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 749, 218 
N.L.R.B. 1330 (1975); Teamsters Local 616, 203 N.L.R.B. 645 (1973). For an excellent and 
comprehensive summary and analysis of all relevant Board and court decisions under the single 
enterprise doctrine, see Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 466,532-604 (1972 & Supp. 1978). The Board's 
position regarding the separate-unitary employer issue is in accord with corporate law. As a 
general· rule, a parent corporation is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries; but the former may 
388 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2, No.2 
realities of corporate conglomerates and multinationals because not only is it 
extremely difficult to determine the exact degree of control exercised by a 
parent over a subsidiary, but also financial control - the ultimate authority 
- is usually centralized in the parent. 90 The latter was persuasively argued in 
dissent by Member Brown in AFTRA Washington-Baltimore Local, AFL-CIO: 
In this case we are confronted by nothing more than a labor 
organization's attempt to apply strike pressures upon a single cor-
porate enterprise to secure concessions in its dispute with a segment 
of that enterprise .... That [the parent corporation] is a direct party 
to labor disputes involving its separate divisions is not only inherent 
in the structure of the enterprise but is a matter of cold economIC 
fact. 91 
Recognizing that, in other contexts, courts and legislatures are adopting an 
economic realities analysis,92 it is inappropriate that the Board should cling to 
be held responsible for the obligations of the latter when the subsidiary is a mere agent, in-
strumentality of adjunct of the parent corporation. Krendl & Krendl, Jupra note 79; Comment, 
DiJregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract ClaimJ, 28 OHIO ST. L. J. 441 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
DiJregarding the Corporate Entity]; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1102 (1972); if. note 82 and accompanying 
text. Underlying this theory is a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American law: a corporation is a 
legal entity separate from its shareholders. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 
142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905); Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22, 38; W. 
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS 99 (rev. vol. 1974). 
90. Gould, Jupra note 5, at 661. 
91. AFTRA Washington-Baltimore Local, AFL-CIO, 185 N.L.R.B. 593, 594 (1970) (Brown, 
M., dissenting), erif'd, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Smith, The Supreme Court, Boys Markets 
Labor Injunctions, and Sympathy Work StoppageJ, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 321 (1977), who argues that 
"[d]espite corporate divisional or subsidiary structure only one 'person' exists for the purposes" 
of the NLRA. /d. at 343 n.96. 
92. See United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), for an example of treating two corporate entities as one to bring the foreign 
parent within the jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws. Indeed, there is a growing recognition both 
abroad and in the U.S. that an "economic realities" test should be used in cases where one cor-
poration is beneficially owned by another corporation. In the United Kingdom, there is evidence 
of a general tendency of courts to ignore the separate legal entities of various companies within a 
group, and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole group. L. C. B. GOWER, MODERN 
COMPANY LAW 213, 216 (1969); Jee Merchandise Transport Ltd. v. British Transport Comm'n, 
[1962]2 Q.B. 193,202 (C.A.); Spittle v. Thames Grit & Aggregates Ltd., [1937]4 All E.R. 101, 
103. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Stock Corporation Law of 1965, Law of Sept. 6, 
1965, (1965] BGBI 11089, treats a corporate group - parent and subsidiaries - as an economic 
unit Jui generiJ. WaIde, Parent-SubJidary RelationJ in the Integrated Corporate SYJtem: A CompariJon of 
American and German Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 455,492 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Whlde]. 
The NLRB should recognize that the basic policy consideration inherent in the traditional 
American rule, i.e., limited liability of shareholders, is inapplicable to actions under U.S. labor 
laws. See Douglas & Shanks, InJulationjrom Liability Through SubJidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L. J. 
193, 193-94 (1929). The reasons for disregarding the corporate fiction are different in contracts 
cases than they are in torts cases, different still in cases involving violation of a statute, or applica-
ti.on of internal revenue laws, or the law of fiduciary obligations. DiJregarding the Corporate Entity, 
Jupra note 87, at 467 (and cases cited therein). It is the view of the author that the purposes of 
U.S. labor laws would be served best if the Board adopted some form of an "economic realities" 
test and abandoned the formalistic "single enterprise doctrine." See notes 215-17 irifra and ac-
companying text. 
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SO narrow a conception of corporate existence. 93 As will be argued below, 94 it 
is necessary that the present single enterprise doctrine be modified to include 
therein the various components of MNEs so that unions can adequately 
counter the de facto assistance rendered by subsidiaries to parents, as well as 
parents to subsidiaries, when a union is engaged in a lawful dispute with 
either. 
Closely related to the problem of corporate identity in the multinational 
context is the issue of extraterritorial reach of U.S. labor laws. In order for the 
mandates of collective bargaining or remedies of unfair labor practices to be 
carried out, a foreign subsidiary of an American MNE or a foreign parent 
MNE of an American-based subsidiary may be called upon by the Board to 
undertake some form of affirmative conduct. The issue then involves the 
jurisdiction of U.S. labor laws over these foreign entities. 
B. Extraterritorial Application of U. S. Labor Laws 
The power of Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" is 
contained in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. 95 Pursuant to this 
authority Congress has enacted several labor-management relations statutes to 
govern industrial strife" in order to promote the full flow of commerce' '96 and 
"to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce .... ' '97 The question of the extent to which the NLRB and courts 
should exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations and nationals under 
these Acts is a matter of controversy. 96 In each case it must be decided 1) 
whether Congress intended to exercise its constitutional power to regulate 
commerce so as to reach the extraterritorial conduct in question; and 2) 
whether in the exercise of administrative or judicial discretion the Board or the 
courts should take jurisdiction in a particular case. 
93. The main rationale relied upon by the Board is that the congressional purpose behind the 
secondary prohibitions ofNLRA § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), from which the 
single enterprise doctrine arose, was to insulate the neutral or secondary employer and prevent 
the unnecessary spread of the union-management conflict by narrowing the areas of dispute. N a-
tional Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 
341 U.S. 675 (1951); Ross, American Legal Restrictions on the Use of Economic Weapons Against 
Multinational Employers, 10 CORNELL INT'L L. j. 59,61 (1976-1977) [hereinafter cited as Ross]. 
See § IV.C infra for a full explication of the use of secondary activities by unions. 
94. See text accompanying notes 180-84 infra. 
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
96. LMRA § I, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976). 
97. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 
98. See, e.g., Nothstein & Ayres, The Multinational Corporation and the Extraterritorial Application of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 10 CORNELL INT'L L. j. 1 (1976-1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Nothstein & Ayres]; Comment, Foreign Ships in American Ports: The Question of NLRBJurisdiction, 9 
CORNELL INT'L L. j. 50 (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Foreign Ships]; Comment, 
Flags of Convenience and NLRBJurisdiction, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 195 (1965); Note, Labor Law, Interna-
tional Law and Panlibhon Fleet, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1342 (1961). 
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1. Congressional Intent 
Section 2(6) of the NLRA defines "commerce" as "trade, traffic, com-
merce, transportation, or communication ... between any foreign country 
and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia" or "through any other 
State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country. "99 
On its face, this definition has a broad international scope of subject matter 
jurisdiction. loo The legislative history of this definition also indicates that it 
was intended to give the NLRB all the power constitutionally delegable under 
the Commerce Clause. lol Board and court interpretations, however, have 
severely narrowed the international scope of subject matter jurisdiction under 
the NLRA.l02 
2. Supreme Court and NLRB Decisions 
a. The Maritime Jurisdiction Cases 
In the leading case of Benz v. Campania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 103 the Supreme 
Court discussed Board jurisdiction over unfair labor practicesl04 involving 
foreign parties. In Benz, a foreign shipowner brought a common-law tort ac-
tion against an American union which was engaged in peaceful picketing of a 
foreign flagship. 105 The ship was temporarily in a U.S. port and the picketing 
was in furtherance of a strike over internal matters by the foreign crew. 
Placing the issue in perspective, the Court noted at the outset that 
the dispute from which these actions sprang arose between a foreign 
employer and a foreign crew operating under an agreement made 
99. NLRA § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976). The NLRB is empowered to prevent any unfair 
labor practices affecting commerce. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). "Affecting com-
merce" is defined as "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of 
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce 
or the free flow of commerce." [d. § 2(7), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976). 
100. Ross, supra note 93, at 63. 
101. The jurisdictional definitions were "based squarely on the power of Congress to regulate 
commerce among the several States and with foreign nations .... " H. R. REP. No. 969, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 6 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA 2918 (1935). This same com-
ment was repeated at H. R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 6 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE NLRA 2964 (1935); H. R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10,6 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA 3057 (1935). 
102. In this context, the LMRA is coextensive with the NLRA. See LMRA § 501,29 U.S.C. § 
142(3) (1976); NLRA § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976). 
103. 353 U.S. 138 (1957). 
104. The Board has jurisdiction over unfair labor practices if they are "affecting commerce." 
NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976); see note 99 supra. 
105. A foreign flagship is the equivalent of foreign territory for many purposes. See Convention 
on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [1958]13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82; 
Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. I (1887). 
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abroad under the laws of another nation. The only American con-
nection was that the controversy erupted while the ship was tran-
siently in a United States port and American labor unions par-
ticipated in its picketing. 106 
391 
Because of the foreign elements involved, the Court squarely held that the 
NLRB lacked jurisdiction to consider the controversy. 107 
This decision was based upon an analysis of the legislative history of the 
LRMA. After noting that "if Congress had so chosen, it could have made the 
Act applicable ... ,"108 Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated that 
[tJhe question here therefore narrows to one of intent of the Con-
gress as to coverage of the Act. 
The parties point to nothing in the Act itself or its legislative 
history that indicates in any way that the Congress intended to bring 
such disputes within the coverage of the Act. log 
The Court thus concluded that "[tJhe whole background of the Act is con-
cerned with industrial strife between American employers and employees."l1o 
A strong undercurrent running throughout the decision is the notion of the 
proper role of the Board and the Court in adjudicating cases which involve 
issues of international relations. The majority deferred to the will of Congress 
in denying NLRB jurisdiction: 
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international 
relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Con-
gress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make 
fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of in-
ternational discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain. 111 
Faced with this limitation on its subject matter jurisdiction, the NLRB in a 
trilogy of 1961 cases distinguished Benz in such a way as to create an entirely 
new test which, though not in direct conflict with Benz, was surely without its 
spirit. The most important of these cases was West India Fruit & Steamship Co., 
Inc. 112 An American union filed a complaint with the Board alleging NLRA 
106. 353 U.S. at 142. 
107. /d. at 147. 
108. /d. at 142. 
109. /d. But see note 101 supra and accompanying text. 
110. 353 U.S. at 143-44 (emphasis added). 
111. /d. at 147. These jurisdictional limitations problems are applicable in areas of interna-
tional trade as well. Similar involvement in foreign employment relations can easily result from 
American union actions against MNEs, such as secondary activities against MNE subsidiaries. 
See § IV. C infra. 
112. 130 N.L.R.B. 343 (1961). The other two cases, Peninsular & Occidental Steamship and 
Green Trading Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 10 (1961), and Eastern Shipping Corp.; McCormick Ship-
ping Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 930 (1961), were consolidated with West India for hearing on the 
jurisdictional issues. 130 N.L.R.B. at 345. P. & O. Steamship and Eastern Shipping are discussed 
below. 
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section 8(a)(1) and (3)113 unfair labor practices by a U.S. corporation. The 
company owned a Liberian registered ship which operated as a common car-
rier between Cuba and Louisiana. The crew of the ship, who were Cuban resi-
dent nationals, were allegedly threatened in an attempt to discourage their 
membership in the union and discriminated against because of said member-
ship. These violations allegedly occurred upon the high seas and in Cuban ter-
ritorial waters. 
The NLRB first determinedll4 that, because the ship regularly sailed be-
tween the U.S. and Cuba, it was clearly in "commerce" as defined by the 
Act,1I5 and that the alleged unfair labor practices involved the crew of the ship 
and thus was "affecting commerce" as so defined.u6 Having determined that 
Congress intended to exercise its constitutional power to reach the conduct in-
volved in this case, the Board then considered whether the foreign cont';cts 
present in the case would limit or bar the jurisdiction of the Act. Neither the 
ship's foreign registry,1I7 nor the nonresident alien status of the crewll8 were 
deemed sufficient to divest the Board of jurisdiction. In so holding, the NLRB 
limited Benz to its particular facts ll9 and fashioned a "contacts" approach to 
decide this and future cases with similar jurisdictional issues. 120 Since the ship 
was engaged in "substantial continuing American foreign commerce" and the 
employer was an American corporation, the scales were tipped in favor of 
applying the NLRA.121 
113. NLRA § 8(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(I) (1976) makes it an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to interfere with an employee's right to join a union; and NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(3), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee 
because of his union membership. 
114. 130 N.L.R.B. at 349. 
115. NLRA S 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976); see note 99 supra and accompanying text. The 
Board later stated that 
in Section 2(6), Congress has expressly stated that the Act shall apply to foreign com-
merce such as that in which the Sea Level participates. Furthermore, we have no doubts, 
in view of pertinent court decisions, that a general grant of power over foreign com-
merce, such as in the Labor Act, of necessity includes the authority to reach prohibited 
acts even though occurring in foreign territory when such acts have a direct effect on 
trade between the United States and foreign countries. 
130 N.L.R.B. at 350-51 (citations omitted). 
116. NLRA S 2(7), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976); see note 99 supra. 
117. 130 N.L.R.B. at 359. 
118. Id. at 360-61. It was noted that "the workingmen covered are at least those employed by 
a domestic employer in the foreign commerce of the Nation." 130 N.L.R.B. at 363 n.77. Cj the 
finding in Benz, supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
119. The Board stated that "Benz can surely be distinguished on its facts," 130 N.L.R.B. at 
361, and found no support in Benz for the proposition that the presence of "foreign factors alone 
bars the Act when the undertaking is, as here, essentially an American enterprise operating 
almost exclusively, if not wholly in American commerce .... " 130 N .L.R .B. at 362. 
120. The Board's task was "to determine whether or not the facts in the pr'isent situation 
which constitute contacts between the operation of the Sea Level and the United States are substantial 
- that is more than minimal but not necessarily preponderant." 130 N.L.R.B. at 355 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
121. Id. at 355. 
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West India clearly circumvented the spirit of Benz. The Board disavowed the 
essence of Benz, i. e., no interference in the delicate field of international rela-
tions, by focusing on the American factors and virtually ignoring the poten-
tially disruptive foreign contacts.122 
The contacts approach was again applied in two cases decided shortly after 
West India. Peninsular & Occidental Steamship Co. and Green Trading CO.,123 in-
volved a foreign registered ship with a nonresident alien crew, which was 
operating between Florida and islands in the Caribbean. The vessel was 
owned and operated by Liberian subsidiaries of an American corporation. 
Thus the only substantial difference between the facts of West India and those 
of P & 0 Steamship was the imposition of foreign corporate subsidiaries in the 
ownership and operation of the vessel. The Board held that such an arrange-
ment was ineffective to bar jurisdiction of the NLRA where the corporate 
parent had full control of the ship, was its beneficial owner and was otherwise 
within the coverage of the Act. 124 
Eastern Shipping Corp.; McCormick Shipping Corp. 125 involved facts similar in 
all essential respects to P & 0 Steamship except that here the vessel was owned 
and operated by a foreign corporation which was itself owned by nonresident 
aliens. This corporation entered into an agency contract with a Miami-based 
American firm to handle matters concerning passengers, cargo, repairs and 
provisioning of the ship. After restating its contacts rule developed in West In-
dia and P & 0 Steamship,126 the Board determined that the operation of the 
122. Id. at 363-64. The Board paid lip service to the "incipient conflict with rights offoreign 
nations" emphasized in Benz, 130 N.L.R.B. at 363, but considered the instant situation "vastly 
different for we are dealing with essentially American commerce and the American shipowner." 
130 N.L.R.B. at 364. 
The V. S. Attorney General filed a brief with the NLRB on behalf of the Department of State 
on matters dfmaritime and international law present in the case. 130 N.L.R.B. at ~345 n.4. The 
Department of State felt strongly that assertion of jurisdiction by the NLRB would have' 'poten-
tially serious international repercussions in the relations between the V nited States" and the 
foreign flag countries involved in West India and its progeny. Evidence thereof came in the form of 
diplomatic notes received by State from the Governments concerned. Letter from Secretary of 
State Dillon to Attorney General Rogers (Oct. 27, 1960), reprinted in 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27, 30 (1968). Despite such a warning from executive branch of the V.S. 
Government concerned with foreign affairs, the Board asserted jurisdiction because of the 
American contacts present. 
123. 132 N.L.R~B. 10 (1961). 
124. /d. at 12. 
125. 132 N.L.R.B. 930 (1961). 
126. 
[A]s we concluded in the West India and Peninsular & Occidental cases, the mere presence 
of. , . foreign attributes ... does not necessarily require a finding that the Act does not 
cover the maritime operation involved or that the Board should not assert jurisdiction. 
Rather the question of jurisdiction is to be decided by determining whether or not 
substantial contacts exist between the maritime operation and important V nited S'tates in-
terests, a determination that can only be made upon the facts of the particular case. 
132 N.L.R.B. at 930-31 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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vessel was "a single integrated enterprise in which the various activities essen-
tial to the success of the venture are divided between two companies. "127 
Because the "primary purpose" of the enterprise was "to participate in the 
commerce ofthis Nation," it was covered by the NLRA, notwithstanding the 
foreign elements involved. 128 
These three decisions of the Board, in developing and implementing the 
contacts approach, successively moved further and further away from the 
Supreme Court's holding and rationale in Benz. As the American connections 
became more tenuous with each case, the possibility of "international 
discord" arising from assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations, vessels and crews became more probable. This is not to say that 
Benz was correct in its rationale; it is merely to stress the dichotomy between 
what the Court saw as the proper role of the NLRB in this area and what the 
Board felt was its duty under the Labor Act. Thus, the stage was set for the 
Supreme Court either to repudiate Benz and accept the West India line of 
analysis, or to reject the contacts approach and reaffirm a hands-off policy to 
cases involving foreign elements. 
The scenario was played out in two case~ decided in early 1963. The first of 
these, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,129 had facts 
similar to P & 0 Steamship, 130 with the added factor of representation by the 
crew of a Honduran labor union pursuant to the Honduran Labor Code. 131 
Mr. Justice Clark, the author of Benz, again wrote for the Court. He explicitly 
rejected the West India contacts approach,132 and reaffirmed the rationale of 
Benz: 
We continue to believe that if the sponsors of the original Act or of its 
amendments conceived of the application now sought by the Board 
they failed to translate such thoughts into describing the boundaries 
of the Act as including foreign-flag vessels manned by alien crews. 
Therefore, we find no basis for a construction which would exert 
127. Id. at 932. 
128. Id. at 933-34. 
129. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
130. i.e., an American corporation's wholly owned foreign subsidiary owns and operates a 
foreign registered vessel with a nonresident alien crew between ports in the United States and 
Latin America. 
131. 372 U.S. at 14. 
132. 
[T]o follow [the contacts theory] to the ultimate might require that the Board inquire in-
to the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels calling at American ports. Such 
activity would raise considerable disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in 
our international relations as well. In addition, enforcement of Board orders would pro-
ject the courts into application of the sanctions of the Act to foreign-flag ships on a pure-
ly ad hoc weighing of contacts basis. This would inevitably lead to embarrassment in 
foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice. 
372 U.S. at 19 (citation omitted). 
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United States jurisdiction over and apply its laws to the internal 
management and affairs of the vessels here flying the Honduran 
flag .... 133 
395 
The international ramifications inherent in applying the NLRA to seamen 
already subject to foreign labor laws also were stressed by the Court: "The 
possibility of international discord cannot therefore be gainsaid. Especially is 
this true on account of the concurrent application of the Act and the Hon-
duran Labor Code that would result with our approval of jurisdiction." 134 Mc-
Culloch thus reasserted the principle of Benz, i. e., that interference in the 
delicate field of foreign relations by the Board must rest on "the affirmative 
intention of Congress clearly expressed." 135 Since that intent was found lack-
ing, jurisdiction would be denied. 
Incres Steamship Co., Ltd. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 136 the com-
panion case to McCulloch, held squarely that "the maritime operations of 
foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not in 'commerce' within the 
meaning of § 2(6),29 U.S.C. § 152(6)."137 The dissolution of West India was 
thus complete, since its contacts theory was founded upon a contrary inter-
pretation of "commerce" as defined in the NLRA.138 
The last in the line of cases dealing with maritime affairs have expanded the 
"no interference in international relations" rationale first enunciated in Benz 
to apply to U.S. domestic situations which may have an extraterritorial effect. 
In Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO,139 the 
Court held that picketing by American unions to protest the allegedly sub-
standard wages paid foreign seamen of foreign ships came within the rule of 
Benz because "[v]irtually none of the predictable responses of foreign 
shipowner to picketing of this type, therefore, would be limited to the sort of 
wage-cost decision benefiting American workingmen which the LMRA was 
designed to regulate. "140 Neither is such picketing a prohibited secondary ac-
tivity which would invoke Boardjurisdiction under the NLRA. As was held in 
American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, Inc.,141 such union ac-
tivity is not in "commerce" because the purpose of the picketing was to affect 
wages paid foreign seamen who were outside the jurisdiction of the Act.142 
133. ]d. at 20. 
134. ]d. at 21. 
135. Id. at 22; Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). 
136. 372 U.S. 24 (1963). 
137. ]d. at 27. 
138. See note 115 supra for an explication of the Board's rationale in West India which was re-
jected by Ineres. 
139. 415 U.S. 104 (1974). 
140. ]d. at 115. 
141. 419 U.S. 215 (1974). 
142. ]d. at 224. 
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The Supreme Court in these two cases broadened the "no interference in 
international relations" test to include even those domestic activities that 
would have an extraterritorial economic effect on the foreign shipowner. 143 
Thus, as the law now stands, where the direct effect of the economic activity 
by an American union is outside of the employment relationship of its 
members, the NLRB is without jurisdiction because the activity in question is 
not in and does not affect U. S. commerce as defined by the Act. 144 
b. Recent Representation and Bargaining Unit Cases: NLRB Withdrawal 
Having learned its lesson after being rebuked by the Supreme Court in Mc-
Culloch and its progeny, the NLRB has recently held either that it lacked 
jurisdiction or that it would decline to exercise jurisdiction145 in a series of 
representation decisions. 146 The primogenitor of this line of cases is RCA OMS 
Inc. (Greenland). 147 In this case, a union sought to represent American 
employees of a U.S. subsidiary of RCA who were doing defense work at five 
Distant Early Warning (DEW Lines) sites located in Greenland. Despite the 
facts that the employees were all Americans, were required to have U.S. 
Government security clearances, were hired in the United States, were paid 
from the United States, were returned to their original hiring location in the 
U.S. upon completion of their jobs, and worked for an American employer, 
the Board concluded" that Greenland does not come within the jurisdiction of 
the Act." 146 The only authority cited for this holding was Benz v. Compania 
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A.149 
However, the holding in RCA OMS does not follow from that of Benz. 
Whereas in the latter, the Court refused to extend NLRA jurisdiction to 
foreign employers of a wholly foreign enterprise operating on what is the 
equivalent of foreign territory (the foreign flagship), in the former, the Board 
refused to apply the Act to American employees of an American enterprise 
operating partly in the United States and partly in a foreign country. The fac-
tual differences make the cases easily distinguishable. 150 Only the "no in-
143. See Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 415 U.S. 
104,114 (1974). 
144. Ross, supra note 93, at 67; Comment, Foreign Ships, supra note 98, at 67. 
145. The NLRB has discretionary authority to "decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor 
dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the ef-
fect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its 
jurisdiction .... " NLRA § 14(c)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(I) (1976). 
146. The NLRA gives to the Board the power to determine appropriate bargaining units, 
NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976), and the power to certify unions as the proper repre-
sentatives of employees. !d. § 9(c)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I) (1976). 
147. 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973). 
148. Id. Accord GTE Automatic Electric Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1222 (1976); if. Freeport 
Transport Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 833 (1975). 
149. 353 U.S. 138 (1957). 
150. Accord Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 98, at 24. 
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terference in international relations" rationale of Benz could support the RCA 
OMS holding. Since Greenland's interest in and concern about the labor rela-
tions between American employees and their American employer is not so ob-
vious nor is it likely to lead "international discord" or "retaliative action, "151 
the Board's refusal to exercise jurisdiction is questionable. 
Shortly after RCA OMS, the NLRB refused to assert jurisdiction and order 
an election in a unit composed of Panamanian bus employees who worked in 
the Canal Zone for an American corporation. The Board, in Contract Services, 
Inc., 152 relied upon a lower court interpretation of McCulloch 153 to hold that" in 
deciding whether or not to exercise our discretion to assert jurisdiction herein, 
the effect thereof on foreign relations is a necessary and proper factor to be 
considered." 154 Using this standard, the Board concluded" that it would not 
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in the instant case since 
such action might at this time adversely affect United States-Panamanian rela-
tions. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition." 155 Thus, despite the fact 
that the Canal Zone was assumed to be a U.S. territory and within jurisdiction 
of the Act, 156 the Board exercised its discretionary power and refused to assert 
its jurisdiction because of possible foreign policy ramifications. 
Contract Services raises many questions about the outer reaches of the" effect 
on foreign relations" doctrine therein enunciated. In a global community 
where the economies of States are interdependent, the labor relations activities 
in American enterprises can have a substantial impact on foreign enterprises 
and on the foreign relations of the United States. This is especially true in 
situations involving MNEs.157 A labor dispute concerning the U.S. parent of a 
multinational can have a very substantial impact on its foreign subsidiaries. 
Likewise, a strike against an American division of a foreign MNE can have 
adverse consequences for the home corporation. Will the Board henceforth 
scrutinize every labor dispute against MNEs for their effects on American 
foreign affairs and decline jurisdiction in all those where those effects are 
151. 353 U.S. at 147. 
152. 202 N.L.R.B. 862 (1973). 
153. National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967), wherein the court stated, 
the opinion of the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional makes it perfectly 
clear that considerations of international relations are highly relevant - indeed, in-
dispensable - in determining the extent of the Board's jurisdiction. This court 
perceives no reason why such considerations are not equally relevant to the Board's 
determination whether to assert jurisdiction. 
[d. at 126. 
154. 202 N.L.R.B. at 864. 
155. ld. at 865. 
156. ld. at 863. 
157. See Rubin, Multinational Enterprise: The Limits of Theory: Forward, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L 
Bus. 307, 309 (1974). 
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deemed too substantial?158 Will it adopt a per se rule excluding all employees 
who are without the borders of the U.S.?159 Absent a change of direction by 
the Board or the Supreme Court, these are distinct possibilities which can have 
no effect but to increase the already disparate bargaining positions of unions 
and MNEs. 
3. Present Status of the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Labor Laws 
Unlike the extraterritorial effect of U. S. antitrust laws/60 that of our labor 
laws is quite limited. The Windward Shipping-Mobile Steamship broadening of 
the original Benz "no interference in international relations" test161 has so 
emasculated the reach of "commerce" under section 2(6),162 that even "in-
nocuous activity" by American unions which has an economic impact on 
foreign shipowners "could be beyond the reach of the Board's realm."163 
Similarly, the Contract Services "effect on foreign relations" doctrine, which 
also grew out of the Court's rationale in Benz and by which the NLRB will 
gauge its discretionary power to decline jurisdiction, could render otherwise 
legitimate activity which is ordinarily within its jurisdiction, outside of the 
158. Such a practice would be tantamount to a balancing of interests approach, similar to the 
West India balancing of contacts analysis, only with the scales titled this time against exercise of 
jurisdiction. 
159. This is the practical effect of RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228 (1973); GTE 
Automatic Electric, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1222 (1976) (employees of an American multinational 
working in Iran excluded from a proposed bargaining unit including American based 
employees); and The North American Soccer League and Its Constituent Member Clubs, 236 
N.L.R.B. No. 181, 98 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1978) (employees of Canadian NASL clubs excluded 
from bargaining unit which included all league players); cf Freeport Transport, Inc., 220 
N.L.R.B. 833 (1975). 
160. E.g., the Supreme Court has held that, in enacting the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(1976), "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its constitutional power in restraining 
trust and monopoly agreements .... " United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 
U.S. 533, 558 (1944). Consequently, the Act's applicability to foreign commerce is as broad as 
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, which includes' 'every species of commercial in-
tercourse between the United States and foreign nations." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) I, 7 (1824). In the landmark decision of the Second Circuit, United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge Learned Hand found that Congress intended 
to reach conduct outside of the United States which was intended to and actually does have conse-
quences within this country. !d. at 144. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA· 
T10NS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) adopted in a somewhat modified form Hand's 
"intended effects" test. 
The courts currently give the Sherman Act broad reach. See the cases collected and discussed 
in Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. 
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199, 214-19, 220-27 (1977). Thus, the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act is now well established in United States' law. See also Donovan, Antitrust Considera-
tions in the Organization and Operation of American Business Abroad, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 239, 
242-50 (1968). 
161. See notes 143-44 supra and accompanying text. 
162. NLRA § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976). 
163. Comment, Foreign Ships, supra note 98, at 68. 
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regulatory authority of the Board. It remains to be seen how far each of these 
standards will be carried. Suffice it to say that the extraterritorial reach of U.S. 
labor laws is presently severely limited and that the matter requires significant 
consideration. 
C. Domestic Union Activiry Aimed at MNEs 
An area of conflict which ties together the related single employer-separate 
employer and extraterritorial effect problems is the status under U.S. labor 
laws of certain economic weapons available to unions for use against MNEs. 
The legality or illegality of a given labor activity may well turn on a deter-
mination by the Board of the separate or unitary nature of the MNE. If the 
MNE is deemed unitary, certain NLRB orders may require action by the 
foreign component of the multinational thereby giving extraterritorial effect to 
our labor laws. 
Strikes, boycotts and picketing are powerful union weapons which can be 
utilized against MNEs. Their legality in the U.S. depends, however, upon 
various factors. If the concerted activity is directed against that division of the 
enterprise which directly employs union members and its purpose is to extract 
economic concessions from the firm, it is a "primary" action and lawful 
under the NLRA. On the other hand, if the concerted activity is against a seg-
ment of the MNE which is not in a proximate employer-employee relation-
ship, then the action will be deemed "secondary" and prohibited by the 
Act. 164 Therefore it is important to examine the ramifications of the prohibi-
tions on secondary activity contained in the NLRA since they can act as major 
obstacles to effective use of union power against multinationals and thereby 
contribute to the inequality of bargaining power. 
Prohibitions on secondary labor pressures long have been present in 
American law. 16S After a short respite during the 1940s,166 secondary 
pressures were made an unfair labor practice in the Taft-Hartley amendments 
to the NLRA.167 The Board is empowered to issue a cease-and-desist order.16S 
Further, an injunction against probable secondary pressures can be obtained, 
164. For a discussion of how the separate divisions of an MNE are treated for purposes of 
primary or secondary pressures, see S IV.A supra. 
165. Most states at common law treated coercion against a person who was "uninvolved" in 
the labor dispute of another company as an illegal exercise of secondary pressure. E.g., 
Bricklayer's Union v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931). The Sherman Act 
prohibited secondary boycotts which affected the delivery or receipt of goods in interstate com-
merce. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). 
166. The Supreme Court read the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. U 101-15 (1976), to 
shelter the secondary boycott from antitrust liability, both civil and criminal. United States v. 
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
167. LMRA, ch. 120, § 101,61 Stat. 140 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) 
(1976». 
168. NLRA § 1O(c) , 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). 
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even in advance of a Board hearing on the merits. 169 Congress even went so 
far as to render the secondary boycott a federal tort for which compensatory 
damages could be sought from the union. 170 
While not using the term "secondary boycott," Congress attempted to spell 
out in detail the conduct which was proscribed in NLRA section 8(b)(4)(B).171 
This section prohibits the application of economic pressure to "injure the 
business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement be-
tween an employer and his employees. "172 The gravamen of the secondary 
boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party 
to the dispute, but upon some third party who is unconcerned with it. 173 Even 
if the primary dispute is outside of the United States, the Board can prohibit 
an American union from supporting its foreign counterpart by refusing to 
handle the foreign employer's goods. 174 
Recognizing that it is innocent, unconnected third-parties who are to be 
protected by § 8(b)(4)(B), the NLRB has developed an exception to the sec-
ondary pressures prohibition. In general, a secondary employer loses his 
neutrality when it becomes an "ally" to the primary employer. Under this 
"ally doctrine," a union may engage in picketing at operations of secondary 
employers when they do strike work for the primary employer,175 when the 
employers are engaged in a "straight-line" operation to produce a single 
169. /d. § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). 
170. LMRA § 303,29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). 
171. NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), reads: 
it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person 
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a 
refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or 
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to per-
form any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is -
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, 
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person, ... : Provided, that nothing 
contained in clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise 
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing .... 
172. 93 CONGo REC. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft) (emphasis added), reprinted in 2 
N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT. 1947, at 1106 
(1948). 
173. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626 n.16 (1967), citing, Int'l 
Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.); accord Local 
Union No. 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 
208 N.L.R.B. 540 (1974); Consolidated Gas Co. of Savannah, 107 N.L.R.B. 148 (1953). 
174. Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed Mill Workers, Int'l Longshoremen, Local 418 v. NLRB, 
376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
175. NLRB v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Conf. Bd., Local 459, 228 
F.2d 553, 558-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1955). 
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product,176 and in cases where two or more corporations constitute a single 
employer in fact. 177 
The Board often has applied § 8(b)(4)(B) to corporate conglomerates. It 
developed the "single enterprise doctrine" to deal with such cases. This doc-
trine holds that if the parent exercises actual or active control over the day-to-
day operations or labor relations of the subsidiary then both are deemed to be 
a single employer. 178 A union then may apply economic pressure against both 
without violating the standard of § 8(b)( 4 )(B). If the requisite degree of control 
is absent, union pressure against the corporate arm which is not in a prox-
imate employer-employee relationship with union members would violate § 
8(b)(4)(B).179 The union would have to prove the existence of an ally relation-
ship to prevent an unfair labor practice charge being preferred against it. 
The present single enterprise and ally doctrines are wholly unrealistic in 
their application to MNE-union relationships.180 They ignore the economic 
realities of the multinational because a labor dispute with any segment of the 
MNE affects the economic health of the entire enterprise. 181 Indeed, the 
rationale underlying § 8(b)(4)(B) compels a change in Board policy. Since the 
various divisions of a corporate conglomerate are not third parties wholly un-
concerned with the labor dispute, they are not entitled to insulation from the 
ramifications of the controversy. 182 
By removing this artificial barrier to effective union action against the 
MNE, the Board would help equalize the presently existing unequal bargain-
ing situation by making the MNE more amenable the union pressures. 183 
Coordinated transnational union strategies would be possible because 
American unions would be allowed to engage in economic activity in support 
of foreign workers employed by the same MNE.184 Since such labor solidarity 
will result in an increase in labor power, union demands will be achieved more 
176. Packinghouse Employees & Warehousemen's Union Local 616, 203 N.L.R.B. 645, 647 
(1973). 
177. Miami Newspaper Pressman's Local No. 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963); 
Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 466 (1972); see § IV.A supra. 
178. See the cases cited in notes 88-89 supra and accompanying tel(t. 
179. /d. . 
180. See notes 90-93 supra and accompanying text. 
181. See Wiilde, supra note 92, at 487, who posits that the independent pursuit of profit by the 
parent and subsidiary leads to sub-optimization of profits for the group. Efficient management 
requires that the subsidiary be subjected to the objective of group profit maximization. Since 
"central coordination typifies most MNE's today," id., it follows that any action which adversely 
affects the profits of one segment of the group, has the same effect on the integrated economic en-
tity as a whole. Labor strife is one factor which causes lost profits; therefore, the enterprise as a 
whole is both affected by and concerned with the labor relations of each segment. 
182. AFTRA Washington-Baltimore Local, AFL-CIO, 185 N.L.R.B. 593, 594 (1970) 
(Brown, M., dissenting), enf'd, 462 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Gould, supra note 5 at 661. 
183. See Ross, supra note 93, at 84-86. 
184. See note 13 supra. 
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readily than is presently the case. Removal of the secondary prohibitions now 
existing will occur only through Congressional action unless there is a striking 
reversal of policy by the NLRB and the courts. 
V. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Labor organizations in the United States have attempted to enlist govern-
mental support to achieve their goal of reducing the power of MNEs relative 
to unions. These attempts have focused primarily on expanding the breadth of 
existing labor relations legislation through NLRB and court cases. After suc-
cessive failures in this regard,165 new legislation was proposed. It was designed 
to reduce the causes of the inequality of bargaining power. Congressional sup-
porters of labor sought to amend American trade and tax laws to regulate 
foreign direct investment, transfers of technology and importation of goods 
from foreign subsidiaries of MNEs in such a way as to prevent or minimize 
adverse impacts on employment and bargaining strength of U.S. workers. 
The defeat of this legislation was more a result of choosing the wrong avenue 
of reform than of the defectiveness of the ultimate goals of the proposed 
changes. 
It is the author's contention that rather simple amendments to the National 
Labor Relations Act would go far towards achieving labor's goal. Organized 
labor has yet to suggest any changes in the NLRA to remedy the present 
power imbalance. 166 The abortive trade and tax law changes and the proposed 
amendments will be discussed at length below. 
A. The Burke-Hartke Bill 
The AFL-CIO in 1971 developed and supported legislation outside the 
NLRA as an alternative approach to strengthen labor's position vis-a-vis the 
multinationals. The Burke-Hartke Bilp67 sought to impose major new con-
straints on MNEs. First, through elimination of taxation deferral of foreign 
income until repatriated to the U.S. and by permitting only deductions as op-
posed to credits for payment of foreign taxes,168 it would increase U.S. tax 
liabilities of corporations doing business abroad. 189 Second, it would require a 
presidential prohibition of all direct or indirect investments of capital and 
transfers of technology abroad when such action would result in a net decrease 
185. See § IV supra. 
186. Kujawa, supra note 1, at 942. 
187. S. 2592, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONGo REC. 33584 (1971). For a discussion of the 
major aspects of the Bill, see AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 111-12. 
188. S. 2592, tit. I, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONGo REC. 33584-86 (1971). 
189. For the proposition that a credit is worth more to a taxpayer than a deduction, see S. 
SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES AND 
MATERIALS 114 (1972). 
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in employment in the United States. 190 Third, new disclosure of information 
requirements would be imposed on U.S. MNEs to allow Congress to gauge 
the impact of foreign investment upon American employment. 191 Finally, the 
import of manufactured products would be restricted (especially those pro-
duced abroad with American-made components)192 at least partly to prevent 
American firms from meeting domestic demand through foreign 
production. 193 
The AFL-CIO vigorously supported the Bill arguing that it would revamp 
"U.S. foreign trade, tax and investment laws to overcome growing problems 
of the export of American jobs, trade imbalances and an increasingly distorted 
U.S. economy. "194 Opponents of the measures replied that the Bill "would 
shrink both the exports and imports of the United States, and impose hand-
icaps on the foreign affiliates of U. S. firms that would make it difficult for 
them to survive against their foreign competitors."195 Changes in U.S. trade 
legislation196 accomplished a small part of the Bill's objectives, but the Bill 
itself was never even reported out of committee. 
The Burke-Hartke Bill was clearly a case of legislative overkill which could 
not be sold to those members of Congress who were not in total agreement 
with labor's position. The perceived adverse ramifications on U.S. MNEs and 
U.S. trade doomed the Bill to failure. In addition it imposed substantive 
regulation in areas which more properly belong to the dispute resolution pro-
cedures of our industrial relations system. Protection of union strength and 
190. S. 2592, tit. VI, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONGo REC. 33588 (1971). 
191. /d., tit. VII, 117 CONGo REC. 33588-89 (1971). 
192. /d., tits. III, IV, V, 117 CONGo REC. 33586-88 (1971). 
193. For an example of the kind of operation these changes sought to regulate, see C.M., 
Chrysler Cut Costs in Mexico Plants, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1979, § D, at I, col. I, which describes 
how American auto and electronics manufacturers ship U.S. parts just across the Texas border to 
Juarez, Mexico, for assembly there by cheap labor, and importation back into the U.S. with only 
a value-added import duty assessed. See also Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1979, at 32, col. 3. 
194. Multinational Corporations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Finance 
Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1973) (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Dep't of 
Legislation, AFL-CIO). 
195. Letter from Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve 
System, to Senator Jacob K. Javits (Mar. 16, 1972), reprinted in The 1972 Economic Report of the 
President: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 183, 184 (1972). Indeed, 
one commentator has termed the Burke-Hartke Bill "the most protectionist piece of legislation 
proposed since mercantalist times." Hildebrand, supra note 8, at 27. 
196. Trade Act of 1974, S 283, 19 U.S.C. § 2394 (1976), provides that firms moving their pro-
duction facilities outside the U.S. should offer employment opportunities in the U.S. to 
employees who lose their jobs as a result of the move and to assist those employees in relocation. 
Also, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which insures certain direct foreign in-
vestments made by U.S. corporations, is empowered to decline to issue such insurance or invest-
ment guarantees to projects which would "significantly reduce the number of [the investor's] 
employees in the United States .... " 22 U.S.C. S 2191(k)(1)(1976), as amended by OPIC Amend-
ments Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-268, S 2, 92 Stat. 213; see note 33 supra. 
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unit employment are subjects over which labor and management should 
bargain. They should not be imposed by legislative fiat because to do so would 
be contrary to traditional concepts of American labor law, which favor the 
establishment of procedures to govern industrial conflicts rather than the im-
position of substantive terms upon the parties. 197 Thus, although the basic 
motivations for the Bill (protection of U.S. employment and union strength) 
were well-taken, the method of reform· chosen was incorrect. 
As has been pointed out, it is the interpretations given to present U.S. labor 
laws that lead to much of organized labor's impotence in dealing with MNEs 
to protect the jobs and bargaining strength of American workers. What is 
needed is a series of amendments to the NLRA which overrule the Board and 
court interpretations and rectify the power imbalance that now exists. 
B. NLRA Amendment Proposals 
The apparent success codetermination has had in Germany and Sweden in 
curbing MNE bargaining power warrants consideration of its adoption in the 
United States. Some attempts at employer representation on corporate boards 
have already been made,198 but the idea has not been widely accepted by 
American labor unions. 
The problem then, is how to implement codetermination in those industries 
where labor is receptive to the idea while not imposing it upon both manage-
ment and unions who do not want it. In keeping with U.S. labor law tradition, 
employee codetermination could be made simply one more subject of collec-
tive bargaining. '99 To prevent stonewalling by management, § 8( d) of the 
NLRA200 would be amended20' to require that employee representation on the 
board of directors be a mandatory subject of bargaining. 202 An amendment to 
§ 8(a)(2)2°3 might be necessary to prevent a charge of employer interference 
with or domination of the labor organization involved. 204 
197. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 Harv. L. Rev: 
1394,1417-18 (1971). 
198. See Blumberg, Reflections on Proposalsfor Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of 
the Board of Directors: "Speciallnttrest" or "Public" Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547,566 (1973); 
Stokes, More Worker Power, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1979, § A, at 19, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as 
Stokes]; N.Y. Times, May 13,1976, at 51, col. 8. 
199. See Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 18, at 987-1009. 
200. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). 
201. After the amendmenl, § 8(d) could read: 
to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and 
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable time and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, employee representation in the management of the enterprise of the 
employer, and other terms and conditions of employment. 
/d. (suggested amendment emphasized). 
202. Accord Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 18, at 1008. 
203. NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976) provides that it is an unfair labor practice 
for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it. ... " 
204. Codetermined boards arguably could be classified as labor organizations under NLRA § 
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This voluntaristic approach seems well suited to American industrial rela-
tions. It allows labor and management to assess codetermination in context 
with other economic demands made during collective bargaining. Since the 
law would merely require bargaining about employee representation in 
management, the parties themselves decide whether or not codetermination is 
necessary. The normal principles and strategies of collective bargaining would 
then determine whether or not code termination would be implemented. 205 
The mandatory nature of the obligation to bargain is of critical importance. 
Without such a duty, management retains an ultimate veto over employee at-
tempts to influence certain corporate decisions which affect them. This is the 
fatal defect of a recent suggestion206 that, in place of employee codetermina-
tion, management be required only to "meet and discuss" with labor about 
certain decisions which it is not presently obligated to do. 207 By equating 
codetermination with "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
2(5),29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976). See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959); NLRB v. 
Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). Ifa court found employer 
domination of the board, an unfair labor practice finding would be made. But, it has been sug-
gested that recent cases support the view that courts would not invalidate codetermined boards 
under § 8(a)(2). Note, Employee Codetermination, supra note 18, at 1001; see Modern Plastics v. 
NLRB, 379 F.2d 201,204 (6th Cir. 1967); Coppus Engineering v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564,572-73 
(1st Cir. 1956); see also Note, New Standardsjor Domination and Support Under Section 8(aX2), 82 YALE 
L.J. 510, 519-32 (1972-1973); Wulff, The West German Model ojCodetermination Under Section 8(aX2) 
oj the NLRA, 31 IND. L.J. 795 (1976). 
Because American courts have never had occasion to rule on the issue such speculation is risky. 
To avoid an adverse determination, § 8(a)(2) should be amended to provide that codetermined 
boards are without its proscription. 
205. Bruce Stokes of the Worldwatch Institute recently commented on the adoption of 
codetermination through collective bargaining in the United States. Writing in The New York 
Times, he noted that labor should seriously consider codetermination as a contract term because 
"[a) seat on the board of directors ... may ultimately prove more valuable to workers and to 
unions than a paycheck that is fatter by yet another 1 percent." Stokes, supra note 198, at col. 1. 
Management as well should look favorably on codetermination because, as Stokes points out: 
"Recent surveys show that both productivity and the quality of work life improve and that 
worker-related drags on economic performance - absenteeism, turnover and strikes - diminish 
when employees assume new responsibilities." /d. at col. 3. 
Commenting on employee codetermination in West Germany, James Furlong states that "ex-
perience has shown that the worst fears about the system haven't materialized. The common in-
terest of workers and shareholders in a healthy company has proven more important than their 
differences." Furlong, supra note 32. This experience in Germany should be instructive to labor 
and management in the U.S. when considering whether to adopt codetermination during collec-
tive bargaining. 
206. Kujawa, supra note 1, at 964-67. 
207. Management must discuss with labor decisions relating to certain reductions of unit 
employment, see, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (subcon-
tracting), but not about other matters as to which management makes the final decision. See, e.g., 
Cox & Dunlop, Regulation oj Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. 
REV. 389,401 (1950). Since any "meet and discuss" requirement necessarily involves matters as 
to which management makes the final decision, if no change is made which requires a cooperative 
decision-making effort, then management retains the power to make the ultimate .decision and 
can effectively ignore labor's suggestions and protestations. 
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employment," Congress would be giving it the character necessary to effect a 
true change in the bargaining power imbalance that now exists. 
Codetermination in and of itself is not the solution to the problem. It is 
merely an addendum to collective bargaining in areas where traditional 
dispute resolution is not fully effective. 208 Further changes in the NLRA are 
needed. 
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the NLRB which severely 
restrict the extraterritorial reach of the U. S. labor laws209 could be overruled 
by a simple declaration of Congress that it intends to expand the scope of 
"commerce"210 to its constitutional limit, 211 just as is the case with the Sher-
man Act. 212 Such a declaration would subject activity which has substantial ef-
fects on unit employees but is presently unregulated213 to Board jurisdiction. 
This would remove the dual threats that even "innocuous activity" of an 
American labor organization which has an extraterritorial economic effect, 
and activity which may have an effect on foreign relations, will not be subject 
to the checks and balances of U.S. labor laws. 214 
In contrast, an area of MNE-Iabor relations which should be deregulated to 
some extent is the secondary boycott. The Board's present single enterprise 
and ally doctrines215 unduly restrict labor action which attempts to pressure 
the MNE by concerted activity against its various components. A change by 
Congress of NLRA § 8(b)( 4 )(B), 216 to include therein an "economic realities" 
test,217 would remove the artificial barrier to effective union action against the 
multinational. The concomitant rise in labor power will reduce the bargaining 
strength imbalance now existing. 
208. Note Employee Codetermination, supra note 18, at 995. 
209. See § IV.B.2, 3 supra. 
210. NLRA § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1976); LMRA § 501,29 U.S.C. § 142(3) (1976). 
211. The Supreme Court in American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 
Inc., 419 U.S. 215, 224 (1974), and Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio 
Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 415 U.S. 104, 114 (1974), refused to bring activity which was clearly within 
the constitutional power of Congress to regulate within the scope of commerce as set out in the 
labor laws. The NLRB in RCA OMS, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 228, 228 (1973) and Contract Serv-
ices, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 862, 865 (1973), developed a per se exclusion rule and an "effect on 
foreign relations" doctrine to find no jurisdiction and to decline jurisdiction respectively, relying 
in part upon the scope of commerce under the NLRA. In both cases, the activities involved were 
clearly within the reach of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 
212. See note 160 supra. 
213. For example, as was noted in dissent by Justice Brennan, the majority in Windward "ef-
fectively deprives American seamen ... of any federally protected weapon with which to try to 
save their jobs." Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 415 
U.S. 104, 116 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since the rationale of Windward and the later 
Mobile Steamship is not limited to maritime issues alone, Brennan's observation applies with as 
much force to analogous situations involving MNEs and their American employees. 
214. See § IV.B.3 supra. 
215. See note 88 supra and accompanying text and notes 175-77 supra and accompanying text. 
216. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). 
217. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. 
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No single one of the suggested amendments to the NLRA would be suffi-
cient to provide a national labor union with the power necessary to countervail 
that of transnational capital. However, the implementation of the combina-
tion thereof magnifies the effect of each so that labor and management would 
face each other as relative equals. The resultant balance of power would pro-
mote concessions by both sides to their mutual advantage and to the advan-
tage of U.S. commerce. 218 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Comment has been to examine various solutions to the 
problem ofunion-MNE bargaining power imbalance. The system of codeter-
mination in Europe appears to be a partial answer. But the history and system 
of labor relations in the United States are unlike those of Western Europe. 
Consequently, while the experiences of Germany and Sweden can be drawn 
upon, it is necessary to shape those experiences to fit the U.S. context. Since 
United States labor law is procedure-oriented, changes in procedure may 
represent the solution to the problem. Several such reforms have been sug-
gested as a solution to the problems that exist because of the inability of U.S. 
labor to achieve an equal bargaining position with multinational enterprises. 
Rudy J. Cerone 
218. Ste Findings and declaration of policy, NLRA § 1,29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 
